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Abstract 
This paper investigates the dynamics of stocks in the S&P500 index for the last 30 
years. Using a stochastic geometry technique, we investigate the evolution of the market 
space and define a new measure for that purpose, which is a robust index of the dynamics 
of the market structure and provides information on the intensity and the sectoral impact 
of the crises. With this measure, we analyze the effects of some extreme phenomena on 
the  geometry  of  the  market.  Nine  crashes  between  1987  and  2001  are  compared  by 
looking at the way they modify the shape of the manifold that describes the S&P500 
market space. These crises are identified as (a) structural, (b) general and (c) local. 
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1 Introduction 
 
In 1999, R. Mantegna [1] defined a distance metric based on correlation coefficients 
between the log-price difference of a pair of market securities. This metric allows for 
determining a distance between stocks evolving in time in a synchronous fashion. Since 
the metric was further discussed by Mantegna and Stanley [2] in the book that coined the 
term “Econophysics”, it has been applied in a considerable number of research works 
([3]-[11]). The fact that the metric is a properly defined distance gives a meaning to 
geometric notions in the study of the market. As Mantegna did when the distance was 
first introduced [1], many papers using the metric follow a topological approach.  
Provided  that  a  distance  between  stocks  exists,  it  is  sufficient  to  form  an 
additional hypothesis on the topological space of the stocks (as for example, choosing the 
subdominant ultrametric space, which is obtained from the minimal-spanning tree that 
links the stocks [2]) in order to end up with a connectivity pattern for the stocks. In so 
doing,  one  can  naturally  move  away  from  a  situation  in  which  all  the  stocks  were 
connected to a network of stocks, in which the connectivity pattern was endogenously 
determined.  From  the  topological  point  of  view,  it  opens  a  large  set  of  promising 
possibilities to explore.   
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Using  Mantegna’s  metric  we  followed  a  different  perspective.  In  a  previous 
contribution [12] we developed a method for the reconstruction of an economic space. By 
using  a  stochastic  geometry  technique,  we  proved  that  economic  spaces  are  low-
dimensional entities and that this low-dimensionality is caused by the small proportion of 
systematic information present in correlations among stocks. Using our reconstruction 
method we found that part of the correlation contribution is virtually indistinguishable 
from random data.  
In the present paper, we investigated the hypothesis that market spaces uniformly 
contract during crashes along their effective dimensions and concluded that, otherwise, 
some crashes may act differently on specific directions, causing interesting changes in the 
shape of the market space. In order to capture that distortion effect, the evolution of the 
market space is verified as it is reconstructed under a moving window over an interval of 
16 days. A structure index is then used to compute the lack of uniformity among the 
market effective dimensions. As a consequence, we are able to characterize the structures 
that emerge in relevant historical periods and to identify the economic sectors that are 
associated to important changes in the leading directions of the evolving market space. 
It  is  empirically  observed  that  both  during  expansion  and  normal  periods  the 
market  tends  toward  randomness  whereas  in  the  disturbed  periods  its  structure  is 
reinforced, not only in the topological sense (as revealed by the clustering measures) but 
also in the geometrical sense, considering distortions of form. From this observation we 
propose a new measure of the dynamics of the market structure, which captures that 
distortion effect in the shape of the market space. 
Some  other  authors  also  discussed  the  existence  of  a  dynamic  pattern  during 
market's crashes ([10], [14]-[20]).  Sornette and his co-authors successfully demonstrated 
that some dynamic patterns can often be found in preceding events. For several extreme 
phenomena, they found evidence of incoming instabilities in the precursory patterns of 
time trajectories of market data (as price, volume and volatility variables). Among their 
main  contributions, there  is  an  issue  that  appears to  be crucial for understanding  the 
behavior  of  the  market:  the  identification  of  distinct  signature  for  endogenous  and 
exogenous shocks originating crashes. In particular, they proved a systematic association 
of large events with positive feedback processes. Later in the paper we shall address that 
issue while applying our structure index to discriminate distinct processes at work in the 
S&P500 stock market. 
The  identification  of  economic  sectors  as  clusters  of  stocks  with  a  similar 
economic  dynamics  was  discussed  in  references  [8]  to  [11].  In  reference  [9], 
Gopikrishnan et al. used techniques that are related to the metric we use, although with a 
different perspective. Diagonalizing the correlation matrix, they have tried to identify 
particular eigenvectors with the traditional industrial sectors. In our analysis the effective 
dimensions of a market space may not correspond to economic sectors. We argue that the 
lack of uniformity among the effective dimensions reveals the existence of a dynamic 
pattern (which we empirically verify that correspond to crashes). To evaluate the impact 
of those extreme phenomena in different economic sectors (and the sectoral dynamics 
among different crashes), we compute the index of market structure for different market 
spaces, each of them comprising stocks that belong to a specific economic sector.  
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In sections 2 and 3 the method is explained in detail and it is applied to a set of 
companies that are or have been in the S&P500 index. In section 4 we discuss the results 
obtained  for  specific  sectors  and  the  role  of  those  sectors  in  some  important  market 
crashes. Finally, a summary and conclusions are presented. 
 
2 Method 
 
The idea is simply stated in the following terms: 
1)  Pick a representative set of N stocks and their historical data of returns over some 
time interval.  
2)  Using  an  appropriate  metric,  compute  the  matrix  of  distances  between  the  N 
stocks.  
3)  From  the  matrix  of  distances  compute  the  coordinates  for  the  N  stocks  in  an 
Euclidean space of dimension D ≤ N-1. 
4)  Apply the standard analysis of reduction of the coordinates to the center of mass 
and compute the eigenvectors of the inertial tensor. 
5)  Apply the same technique to random data with the same mean and variance.  
6)  Compare the eigenvalues in (4) with those in (5) and identify the directions for 
which the eigenvalues are significantly different as being the market characteristic 
dimensions. 
7)  From  the  eigenvalues  of  order  smaller  than  the  number  of  characteristic 
dimensions, compute the difference between eigenvalues in (4) with those in (5). 
The  normalized  sum  of  those  differences  is  the  index  S,  which  measures  the 
evolution of the distortion effect in the shape of the market space. 
 
For both random and actual data, the sorted eigenvalues, from large to small, decrease 
with their order. In the random case, the amount of decrease is linear in the order number, 
proving that the directions are being extracted from a spherical configuration. The display 
of a uniform and smooth decrease in the values of the sorted eigenvalues is characteristic 
of random cases and is also experimentally observed when the market space is built from 
historical data corresponding to a period of business as usual. 
Considering for the lack of uniformity among the market effective dimensions we 
are able to characterize the extent to which crashes act differently on specific directions, 
causing changes in the shape of the market space. Looking for relevant distortions in the 
shape of the S&P500 market space through the last 30 years, we found that amongst the 
highest values of the index are those computed in some important dates, as 19
th October 
1987, 11
th September 2001 and 27
th October 1997.  
In addition to the geometrical analysis of the whole S&P500 market space, our 
measure is applied to sets of stocks that belong to specific economic sectors. Results 
show that some crashes act differently on specific sectors and that the deviation from 
random behavior may be limited to a few days after the day of the crash and also to a 
small number of sector-oriented groups of stocks. Accordingly to these characteristics, 
crises are identified as (a) structural, (b) general and (c) local.  
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3. Measures 
 
From the returns  ) (k r  for each stock 
 
 
(1) 
 
a normalized vector  
 
 
 (2) 
 
 
 
is defined, where n is the number of components (number of time labels) in the vector 
) (k ρ .  With  this  vector  one  defines  the  distance  between  the  stocks  k  and  l  by  the 
Euclidian distance of the normalized vectors.  
 
(3) 
 
as proposed in [1], with  ij C  being the correlation coefficient of the returns  ) (i r ,  ) ( j r . 
The fact that  ij d  is a properly defined distance gives a meaning to geometric notions and 
geometric tools in the study of the market. 
Given that set of distances between points, the question now is reduced to an 
embedding problem: one asks what is the smallest manifold that contains the set. If the 
proportion of systematic information present in correlations between stocks is small, then 
the corresponding manifold will be a low-dimensional entity. The following stochastic 
geometry technique was used for this purpose. 
3.1 The stochastic geometry technique 
 
After the distances ( ij d ) are calculated for the set of N stocks, they are embedded in 
D ℜ , 
where 1 − ≤ N D ,  with  coordinates  { } ) (k x .  The  center  of  mass  R   is  computed  and 
coordinates reduced to the center of mass. 
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R k x k y − = ) ( ) (                 (4) 
and the inertial tensor 
) ( ) ( k y k y T j
k
i ij ∑ =                (5) 
is diagonalized to obtain the set of normalized eigenvectors { i i e , λ }. The eigenvectors 
i e define the characteristic directions of the set of stocks. The characteristic directions 
correspond to the eigenvalues ( i λ ) that are clearly different from those obtained from 
random  data.  They  define  a  reduced  subspace  of  dimension  d,  which  carries  the 
systematic information related to the market correlated structure [12]. 
 
3.2 Index of the market structure 
 
Since the largest d eigenvalues define the effective dimensionality of the economic space, 
we compute S as: 
 
 
(6) 
 
 
where λt(1), λt(2), ..., λt(d) are the largest d eigenvalues of the market space and λ'(1), 
λ'(2), ... λ'(d) are the largest d eigenvalues obtained from random data over the same time 
window and with the same mean and variance. 
Vilela  Mendes  proposed  in  [13]  an  index  that  quantifies  the  effect  of  some 
structure-generating mechanisms in dynamical models, based on the fact that a structure 
in a collective system acquires a characteristic length larger than that of the individual 
components of the system. We develop this strategy for the definition of our structure 
index S: as the dynamics of systems develop a structure-generating mechanism, the index 
S measures the normalized difference between the characteristic length of those structures 
and  the  characteristic  length  of  the  individual  components  of  the  system.  This  is  a 
geometrical approach to define and to measure emergence. 
In  portfolio  optimization  models,  when  the  systematic  and  unsystematic 
contributions  to  the  portfolio  risk  are  distinguished,  the  former  is  associated  to  the 
correlation between stocks (collective structure) and the later to the individual variances 
of each stock [12]. Consequently, when S is applied to the market space, the eigenvalues 
obtained in the random case (λ'(i)) may be taken as reference values that represent the 
characteristic  length  with  which  each  leading  direction  contributes  to  the  shape  of  a 
market whose components were correlated at random. These eigenvalues correspond to 
the characteristic length of the individual (isolated) components of the market. On the 
other hand, the eigenvalues obtained from actual data λt(i) represent the characteristic 
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length of each structure emerging from the dynamics of the market, that is, associated to 
each leading directions of the market space.  
 
4 Results and Discussion 
 
Results were computed in relation to actual daily returns data as well as to random data 
with the same mean and variance.  
 
4.1 The S&P500 effective dimensions 
 
The first set of actual data consists in 249 stocks present in S&P500 from July 1973 to 
March 2003, considering all the surviving firms for the whole period. Part of the ordered 
eigenvalue distributions obtained from actual data and random data is shown in Fig.1. 
  
 
Figure 1: S&P500 249-stocks: decrease of the largest 25 eigenvalues 
 
The plots in Fig.1 represent the largest 25 eigenvalues obtained for the first set of 
actual  data.  The  largest  25  eigenvalues  are  compared  to  the  largest  25  eigenvalues 
obtained from random data. Given the decrease obtained from the 7
th eigenvalue, we 
conclude that the market structure is essentially confined to a 6-dimensional subspace. 
This proves that this subspace captures the structure of the deterministic correlations that 
are driving the market and that the remainder of the market space may be considered, for 
the current purpose, as being generated by random fluctuations.  
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To  test  the  robustness  of  this  conclusion,  we  have  divided  the  data  in  two 
chronologically successive batches (the first consisting in daily data from July 1973 to 
March 1988, while the second batch includes data from March 1988 to March 2003) and 
performed the same operations. In spite of the changes in the market through time, in 
both cases the behavior of the eigenvalues distribution is very much the same.  
Apart from statistical fluctuations, the reconstructed spaces exhibit a reasonable 
degree  of  stability,  confirming  that  the  number  of  characteristic  dimensions  of  the 
S&P500 market space is six. Considering this result, our analysis of the S&P500 market 
shape is based on 6-dimensional subspaces. The question now is to assess the extent to 
which the occurrence of extreme phenomena modifies the shape of this subspace and the 
pattern of behavior of firms and sectors. 
 
4.2 The dynamics of crashes 
 
As extreme phenomena are dated events and as we look for their consequences in 
the distributions of the 6 leading directions, the geometry of the historical data is defined 
considering short periods. In this sense, instead of the large time intervals that defined the 
reconstruction of the S&P500 space as in [12], we adopted a 16-days window as the 
chosen time interval and computed the index of structure with the time window centered 
at several different dates.  
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Figure 2: S&P500 deviation from randomness at different dates,  
comparing crises and a business-as-usual day (6
th May 1997)  
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The  plots  in  Figure  2  show  some  of  these  dates,  namely  the  crashes  of  19
th 
October  1987,  the  Black  Monday,  11
th  September  2001  and  27
th  October  1997,  the 
Second Black Monday. The second plot in this figure shows an unimportant date: May 6, 
1997, as suggested in reference [11], was a typical normal day in the US stock market.  
The plots in figure 2 show λ(i) (with i=1,…,6) obtained from the S&P500 market 
space at four different dates. It is obvious that the values of S obtained for the first and 
the second Black Mondays and for 11
th September 2001 are high, as there is a great 
difference in the decrease of the first six eigenvalues computed from actual and random 
data.  
On the contrary, when the same calculation is performed around a typical normal 
date, the results show that, comparing actual data with random data, there is a quite small 
difference in the decrease of the first six eigenvalues, which is still another piece of 
evidence for the robustness of our method.  
The geometrical changes in the shape of the market space describe the structural 
evolution of the characteristic dimensions. As previously indicated, the normal periods 
qualitatively  tend  to  randomness  while  the  disturbed  periods  will  tend  away  from 
randomness. 
A less detailed but more extensive result is presented in Fig.3, where the plot 
shows the daily values of S for the 30 years period. We used a time moving window of 16 
days on a market space including the 249 stocks, i.e. all firms surviving through the 
whole period. The eight highest values of S are marked on the plot.   
 
The highest peaks are identified and correspond to the following crashes: 
 
1.  October 1987 
2.  October 1989 
3.  October 1997 
4.  October 1998 
5.  April 1999 
6.  Dec.2000/Jan.2001 
7.  April 2001 
8.  September 2001 
 
The  ranking  of  the  crashes  according  to  the  measure  of  S  and  its  explanation  is  as 
follows: 
 
1.  October 1987: Black Monday. 
2.  December 2000-Jan.2001: Argentinean Financial crisis (Argentina and Turkey 
bond market sell-off). 
3.  October 1989: the US stock market falls almost 7%. 
4.  September 2001: attack to the Twin Towers. 
5.  April 1999: Nikkei Crash (Japan). 
6.  March/April 2001: according to the NBER a recession began in the US in March 
2001. 
7.  October 1998: Russian Crash. 
8.  October 1997: Asian Crash, the Second Black Monday. 
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Figure 3: the evolution of the index S, measuring the evolution of the S&P500 structure 
 
It is quite obvious from Fig 3 that we have two periods of crises, clustering in 
1987-1989 and in 1997-2001: the nature of these periods is discussed below. It should 
also be considered that some of the events in the list refer to crises in emergent market 
countries, with considerable effects on the dynamics of the world economy; others refer 
to  the  effect  of  different  factors.   Indeed,  the  nature  of  the  triggering  factors  widely 
varies. The 1987 crash is well researched and corresponds to a major malfunctioning of 
the financial system. As Wright points out [21], the Dow Jones suffered a major loss of 
22,61% the 19
th October 1987, whereas the losses were 12,82% the 28
th October 1929 
and 11,73% the 29
th. Considering the 55 days around the trough, the cumulated loss was 
of 39,6% in 1929 and of 36,1% in 1987.  
Having identified the events corresponding to the eight highest values (peaks) of S 
in the last 30 years (Fig.3), we reconsidered our data investigating the periods around 
each peak. Besides providing a more accurate view of the evolution, it allows for a better 
measurement since at each window we consider a larger number of companies in the 
S&P500. For the purpose of comparison, the first plot in Fig.4 shows the behavior of S in 
the nearby of the highest peak compared to the values of S around a typical normal day in 
the US stock market.   
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Figure 4: The Black Monday and a day of business-as-usual 
 
Considering shorter spans of time, we could include larger sets of stocks for each 
period; consequently, all the entrant firms at each period can be taken into our picture. 
This procedure highlighted the importance of another crash, which was previously hidden 
by our selection of the thirty years’ survivors. In fact, when the window used for scanning 
through our data is 40 days, the highest peaks (SMax= max{St}  ti ≤ t ≤ ti+40 ) organize in 
the following order (Table 1):  
 
Ranking  Date (T)  SMax  Number of Stocks 
included 
1  October 1987  31.6  312 
2  Dec.2000/January 2001  14.2  426 
3  October 1989  10  330 
4  April 2001  7.7  426 
5  April 2000 (NASDAQ)  7.6  424 
6  April 1999  7.2  417 
7  October 1997  6.3  408 
8  October 1998  5.8  414 
9  September 2001  5.5  426 
Table 1: Ranking of the crises according to the values of SMax 
 
Unsurprisingly, the highest peak corresponds to the Black Monday, being not only 
the larger one but also the long-lasting crisis. The most interesting change in the ranking 
of crashes concerns the appearance of the NASDAQ collapse in April 2000, which was 
hidden by the fact that some emerging firms in the nineties were not considered in our  
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previous data set since they did not exist for the whole (30 years) period. Yet, when they 
are considered, the real picture of a turbulent market appears very clearly: it was in the 
Information Technology and Telecommunication sector that most speculation and stock 
activity concentrated in the late nineties, during the Internet bubble, and the NASDAQ 
crash marks its end. This crash proves the dimension of this speculative process. The 
NASDAQ attained its highest peak by early March 2000, and then its all-time highest 
loss by April (35% of loss in relation to the peak the previous month). 
The different crises are compared in the next figures (Figs.5 and 6). They classify 
in three groups: (a) a structural crisis, (b) general crises, and (c) local crises. Local crises 
are shorter and less intense (6 to 9 in our ranking), general crises are longer and more 
intense (2 to 5 in our ranking), whereas a structural crisis (1 in our ranking) is deeper and 
more prolonged. According to the values obtained by SMax, local crises attain maxima of 
around 6, general crises from 7 to 15, and the structural crisis more than 30 (Fig.4). 
A second criterion for the distinction among these types of crises is the rate of 
decay of the values of SMax. For the cases of local crises, these values decrease rather 
quickly after the peak (plus the 16-days moving window), proving that the structure-
generating behavior is short living after the days of the crash.  
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Figure 5: Local crises  
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Figure 6: General crises 
 
A third characteristic distinguishing between local and general crises is presented 
in the next section, where sectoral dynamics is taken into account. Local crises tend to 
concentrate in some specific sectors; in contrast, general crises tend to exhibit a pattern of 
perturbation in all sectors (as Fig. 9 shows). 
 
4.3 Compared sectoral dynamics 
 
When, instead of the whole set of stocks, we consider sub-sets including the stocks of 
firms belonging to the same economic sector 
1 and compute the index of market structure 
for each of these sub-sets, evidence for some interesting properties emerges.  
In a previous paper and using several topological indexes [12], we verified that in 
periods  of  expansion,  sector-oriented  sub-sets  are  characterized  by  a  smaller  average 
distance  between  stocks.  The  average  behavior  of  companies  belonging  to  the  same 
economic sector is more synchronous than the behavior of the overall market taken as a 
whole: in the jungle of the crisis, tribes of firms act together. Now we analyze sectoral 
dynamics by considering the consequences of crashes on the leading directions of nine 
sector-oriented  market  spaces,  being  each  of  them  restricted  to  stocks  in  one  of  the 
following  sectors:  Energy,  Materials,  Industry,  Consumer  Discretionary,  Consumer 
Staples, Health Care, Financials, Information Technology and Utilities. 
                                                 
1  Detailed  structures  of  sectors  and  other  information  from  Global  Industry  Classification  Standard 
(GICS®), available at  http://www.standardandpoors.com/, referenced in June, 2005. 
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In Figs.7 to 9, the histograms show the value of SMax obtained from those nine 
different market spaces, all of them built on the same time period, which is indicated in 
the title of the plots. The results show the remarkable impact of the Asian crisis in the 
Financial sector and the strong effect of the attack to the Twin Towers on the Materials 
and Industrial sectors. 
Again, there is an obvious difference between what we classify as local and as 
general crises. A third characteristic distinguishing between local and general crises is 
obvious  from  the  graphs.  Local  crises  tend  to  concentrate  in  some  specific  sectors 
(financial companies for the Asian Crash, industrial, materials and financial companies 
for the case of the reaction to the 11
th September). In contrast, general crises tend to 
exhibit a pattern of perturbation in all sectors (as Fig. 9 shows). 
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Figure 7: Asian Crash 
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Figure 8: September 11
th  
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The plot in Fig.9 shows the extraordinarily unique character of the 1987 Black Monday: 
this is the only case of a crash provoking a similar dynamics in all major sectors, whereas 
in all other crises the dynamics and time pattern of the main sectors is clearly divergent.  
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Figure 9: Black Monday 
 
Finally, we compare the sectoral dynamics among different crashes, taking the examples 
of Materials and Financials. Because in the Black Monday crisis the index S reaches very 
high values in all sectors, this crisis was intentionally excluded from the plots in Fig.10. 
  
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
0
5
10
15
S
M
A
X
Oct.89
Oct.97
Oct.98
Apr.99
Apr.00
Dec.00
Apr.01
Sep.01
Materials    
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
0
5
10
15
S
M
A
X
Oct.89
Oct.97
Oct.98 Apr.99
Apr.00
Dec.00
Apr.01
Sep.01
Financials   
 
Figure 10: Materials and Financials dynamics  
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The following table summarizes the sectoral pattern of the crashes, indicating the sectors 
leading the structural change: 
 
Date  Leading Sectors 
October 1987 Black Monday  All 
January 2001 Argentinean Crisis  Financials 
October 1989 US stock market  Consumer Staples/Financials 
September 2001  Twin Towers  Industrials/Materials/Financials 
April 2000 NASDAQ  Information Technology (IT) 
October 1998 Russian Crash  Energy/Utilities 
April 1999 Nikkei Crash  Consumer Discretionary 
April 2001 US recession  Energy/IT 
October 1997 Asian Crash  Financials 
Table 2: description of the sectors dominating each crash 
 
From the above results, one notices that the Financials sector is the sector that most 
frequently appears as a leading sector. Its appearance as the leading sector of both the 
Argentinean and the Asian crises is in accordance with the appropriate expectations, since 
each  of  these  crises  corresponds  to  a  major  malfunctioning  of  the  financial  system. 
Another  encouraging  result  refers  to  the  Information  Technology  leadership  at  the 
NASDAQ crisis, settling the end of the Internet Bubble of the second half of the nineties. 
Back to the geometrical tale of our index, a 3 dimensional look at the market 
space that evolves from October 1989 to September 2001 and comprises on average 80 
Financial stocks (the lower plot in Fig.10), would reveal a manifold that: (i) starts from a 
elliptical form (in 1989), (ii) acquires prominences in a particular direction at the 1997 
Asian  Crash,  and  (iii)  turns  back  to  a  close-to-spherical  form  until  the  Argentinean 
Financial  crisis  in  December  2000.  After  a  partial  shape  recovery,  a  new  relevant 
distortion will arrive in September, 2001.  
A  smoother  dynamics  characterizes  the  market  space  built  from  stocks  in  the 
Materials sector along the same time period (1989 to 2001). Accordingly to the results 
presented above (the upper plot in Fig.10), the only relevant shape distortion of that 
market space is the one taking place in 11
th September, 2001; when the structure index S 
reaches a value three times higher than the highest value obtained so far for the Materials 
market space. 
 
4 Conclusions 
 
A stochastic geometry technique proved to be useful for the purpose of describing and 
interpreting the evolution and changes in the dynamics of a market. Furthermore, the 
index S, as defined in this paper, allowed for a useful taxonomy of the nine major stock 
market crises occurring in the last thirty years. Three types of crises were considered: 
local,  general  and  structural  crises.  We  classified  these  crashes  according  to  the 
maximum values of S, but three other operative criteria were useful to describe these 
differences: (1) the decay time of the effects of the crash is reduced in the case of local 
crises; (2) general crises concentrate on several sectors; (3) the structural crisis involves 
all sectors under a similar time pattern. The measure of SMax proved to be useful and 
capable  of  discriminating  among  the  distinct  processes  at  work  in  the  stock  market. 
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  As  the  index  S  captures  the  lack  of  uniformity  among  the  market  effective 
dimensions, we are able to characterize the extent to which crashes act differently on 
specific  directions,  causing  changes  in  the  shape  of  the  market  space.  Looking  for 
relevant distortions in the shape of the S&P500 market space through the last 30 years, 
we  identified  the  events  corresponding  to  crises  in  emergent  market  countries,  with 
considerable effects on the dynamics of the world economy. Others events that were also 
identified refer to the effect of different factors, showing that, the nature of the triggering 
factors widely varies. 
  The  identification  of  the  characteristics  of  each  crisis  allows  for  their 
differentiation. Local crises were imposed either by disarrangements of national stock 
markets from emerging economies (Russia, Asia) and global players (Japan) or by purely 
exogenous factors (the 11
th September attack). The crash provoked by exogenous factors 
is less consequential and is rapidly superseded. Instead, general crises followed another 
pattern: they are deeper, longer and involve a large number of sectors. The Argentinean 
crises (December 2000-January 2001) and the following NASDAQ crisis (April 2000) 
and the US recession (April 2001) initiated or followed the end of the Internet Bubble of 
the second half of the nineties.  
The Black Monday (1987) was the deeper and the longest of all the crashes as 
well as the more general, since it involved all economic sectors. The data suggest that 
another structural crisis may be at work in the clustering of six crashes between April 
1997 and September 2001. 
Finally, the predictive character of our structure index is to be explored in future 
work. 
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